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THE PALSGRAF THEORY
WHAT ESTABLISHED DOCTRINES IT ATTEMPTED TO ALTER
BY LESTER CLARK
At a depot of the Long Island Railroad a passenger
with a small paper wrapped package under his arm ran to
catch a train already moving out of the station. The
passenger jumped for the step of the train, reached it,
and then wavered there attempting to maintain his bal-
ance. Two of the train guards employed by the Railroad
reached to grab the passenger and haul him to safety. As
they did so they dislodged the package under his arm and
it fell to the rails. Though the package to all appear-
ances was innocuous, it in fact contained fireworks which
exploded as a result of the fall. The shock wave from
the explosion threw down some heavy scales many feet
away. A Mrs. Palsgraf, standing under the scales, was
struck by them and severely injured. She subsequently
sued the Railroad for the injuries thus sustained. From
the final decision In that suit, handed down by the New
York Court of Appeals, arose the famous and controversial
Palsgraf Theory. Mr. Justice Cardozo, who was at the
time Chief Justice of the Court and wrote the Majority
Opinion, took that occasion to propound a doctrine of
negligence contra in many ways to what were until then
considered the established doctrines. Justice Andrews,
wfth the concurrance of Justices Crane and O'Brien,
vendered a vigorous dissenting opinion supporting the
accepted views. As its title indicates, this paper will
not deal with the merits of the Palsgraf Theory or its
reception in other courts but rather will attempt to
define exaetly what the theory is and the extent to
which it was intended to alter theretofore accepted
theories.
The Court was agreed as to the following conclu-
sions of fact in the case: (1) It was foreseeable that
the actions of the guards might result in injury to the
passenger they assisted or to his package, and therefore
there was negligence as to this passenger; (2) It was
not foreseeable that the actions of the guards would re-
sult in injury to Mrs. Palsgraf; (3) Their actions were
the proximate cause of the harm to Mrs. Palsgraf. (At
least this contention of Andrews was not denied by
Cordozo.) Thus it is seen that the split of the Court
was caused entirely by differences in theory.
Justice Andrews contended that the theory appli-
cable to the case was that developed from the dicta of
the judges in Smith v. London & Southwestern Ry. Co.,
Exchequer Chamber, 1870. L.R. 6 C.P. 14. A brief state-
ment of that doctrine might be: Once negligence is
shown there is liability to all those whose injuries
were proximately caused by the negligence regardless of
the foreseeability of the injury to them.
Applying the admitted conclusions of fact to the
doctrine, Andrews contended that the Railroad Company
was liable to Mrs. Palsgraf since their acts (the acts
of the guards, their employees) were negligent and were
the proximate cause of the injury suffered. Chief
Justice Cardozo, and the majority, held that the guards
*violated no basic duty of care to Mrs. Palsgraf despite
the facts that they were negligent as to the passenger
boarding the train and that this negligence caused the
injury to Mrs. Palsgraf. If there was no violation of
a duty of care to Mrs. Palsgraf then, Cardozo held,
there was no liability for the injury. In the opinion
of the majority, the factual conclusion that the injury
to Mrs. Palsgraf was unforeseeable gave rise to the
legal conclusion that there was no duty owed. The
theory of duty on which the legal conclusion was based
is the crux of the Palsgraf theory.
THE PALSORAF THEORY OF THE DUTY OF CARE
Chief Justice Cardozo looks first for a duty of
care toward the plaintiff laid upon the defendant's
servants in their acts. He says that the duty of care
- the duty to a'void negligence - is not thrust upon
one unless there is foreseeable "To the eye of reason-
able vigilance," or to the average prudent man, a
possibility that the act complained of would injure the
complaining individual. If the possibility 'of injury
to any person or his interests could be foreseen, then
a duty is laid upon the defendant to us due care in
his actions to avoid injury to that person. A corres-
ponding right to protection against resulting injury
arises in those persons to whom the injury was fore-
seeable. The duty under which the defendant is put
is a duty solely to those whose injury could be fore-
seen, and the right of protection against injury re-
sulting from a breach of duty accrues solely to those
persons.
Chief Justice Cardozo says the duty has an "orbit",
or if you prefer, a range, which extends only so far as
9. prudent man might foresee harm spreading from the act.
rhe duty extends only to those persons who are themselves
within, or who claim interests within, the orbit of duty;
i.e. the area within which injury is foreseeable. From
this concept of the boundary of the duty comes the oft
luoted statement that:
"The risk reasonably to be perceived defines
the duty to be obeyed. "
E STABLISHED DOCTRINES ALTERED BY THE THEORY
By tracing the limits of the intended applicability
of the theory of Mr. Justice Cardozo in the Palsgraf case
we may hope to arrive at a conclusion as to which niche
in the Law he intended it to fill.
Justice Cardozo makes clear that in limiting the
extent of duty to the extent of foreseeability of harm he
does not mean to limit other factors of liability in negli-
gence to the foreseeability-of--harm test.
The decision states that once the duty to a parti-
cular person is fixed, then it is not necessary that harm
to that person or his interests occur in a foreseeable
manner in order that there be liability for the breach
of duty. Professor Cathcart's favorite illustration of
this principle was the case of Reydon v. The Waterworks,
32 S.W. 828. A tank, on a negligently constructed water
tower, fell from the tower onto a house below. This
overturned an oil lamp in the house and the lamp's burn-
ing oil spread to the occupant of the house burning him
to death. Possibility of harm to the occupant could be
foreseen, hence there was a duty to him. However, the
particular manner in which the harm occurred to him might
be held unforeseeable - fire from water is certainly not
a common occurrance and yet there was liability for the
death. Liability here is not inconsistent with the
Palsgraf theory, for Justice Cardozo says:
"This (i.e.: that there is no duty to those not within the
risk.) "does not mean, of course that one who launches a
destructive force is always relieved of liability if the
force, though known to be destructive, pursues an unex-
pected path."
Nor does the defendant necessarily escape liability
under the Palsgraf theory merely because he injured a
particular interest of the plaintiff to which ha-rm was
unforeseeable if his act did foreseeably threaten harm
to another interest, of the plaintiff. Once the duty to
the Particular Plaintiff has arisen through foresee-
ability of harm to the plaintiff's property interest,
then the orbit-of-duty theory of the Palsgraf case is
satisfied; and without inconsistency i.t would be held
that there was liability for unforeseeable injury to
the person of the plaintiff. Justice Cardozo only
states as to this that:
"There is room for argument that a distinction, is to be
drawn according to the diversity of interests invaded."
What requires special emphasis is that the deci-
sion does not concern itself with proximat6 cause. The
fact that the act of a defendant "proxima'tely" or
"directly" caused injury to a plaintiff would avail
the plaintiff nothing unless he could show that the
defendant owed him a duty. Unless duty could be shown
the primary factor of the plaintiff's cause of action
would be missing. The existence of a duty owing to
the plaintiff from the defendant and a breach of that
duty are, of course, the most essential parts of any
cause of action. Justice Cardozo, not finding a duty
owed to the plaintiff, had no occasion to touch upon
the doctrine of proximate cause or its sub theories of
inter vening and responsible cause. True, the theory
of the Palsgraf Case in application would limit the
instances where an inquiry into proximate cause would
be necessary, but it does not attempt to change the
legal theory of causation itself.
In order to establish the defendants, liability
under either the majority or minority view, the plain-
tiff must first establish that there was a duty of
care owed, a breach of that duty by the defendant, and
that this breach of duty proximately caused the plain-
tiff's injury. It is the doctrine of extent of duty,
and not the doctrine of proximate cause, which was
changed by the Palsgraf theory.
A better understanding of what is meant by the
above statement may be facilitated by a more detailed
exposition of older theories on which Justice Andrews
based his dissent. The Andrews view of duty is that
while the duty of care arises originally through fore-
seeability, still, once the duty does arise, then it
is owed to society in general, rather than only to
those whose injury could be foreseen as Chief Justice
Cardozo would have it. But, though he finds the duty
general, Justice Andrews would not have liability ex-
tend to all those to whom the duty was owing. Liabil-
ity extends only to those whose injury is "proximately"
caused by the breach of the duty. Thus though the duty
is unlimited the liability is restricted. But the re-
striction here is not the same as that used by Chief
Justice Cardozo. Cardozo would apply a primary limita-
tion of the duty while Andrews would supply only a se-
condary limitation of liability for the breach of the
duty. It might be suggested that, whether the limita-
tion is primary or secondary, it would be the same
under an interpretation of proximate cause as foresee-
able cause. But Justice Andrews rejects any such idea
both by his statement th&t, "This is not a mere dis-
pute as to words," and his correct interpretation of
proximate cause as not consisting exclusively of,
though including, the factor of foreseeability. Further,
Justice-Andrews does not view foreseeability from the
same position as Chief Justice Cardozo. Foreseeability
of effect in proximate cause is only necessary to con-
tinue the liability of the original where there is an
intervening cause. The foreseeability, to Justice
Andrews, is not necessary from the time of the original
act but only from the time of the occurrence of the
intervening cause. He says:
"Given such an explosion as here it needed no great fore-
sight to predict that the natural result would be to injure
one on the platform at no greater distance from its scene
than was the plaintiff."
Proximate cause, then, is used to limit liability
once a duty is found. It draws an area of liability
within the area of the duty. The Andrews view would
leave the area of duty without boundary while the Car-
dozo view would limit this area of duty to the orbit of
foreseeability. But still, within the area of duty the
Cardozo theory would leave room for the doctrine of
proximate cause to draw a smaller area of liability.
Under this reasoning it may be concluded that the Pals-
graf theory does not throw out the doctrine of proxi-
mate cause. However, the area drawn by proximate cause
could not be larger - could include no more plaintiffs
within its scope - than the area of duty. In this
sense the Palsgraf theory servenly curtails the appli-
cation of the doctrine of proximate cause for those
whose injuries are proximately caused by the act of the
defendant might, in many cases, be without the area of
duty as limited by foreseeability. Proximate caus6,
under the generally accepted rules of negligence, is
used to determine the extent of liability, for an act
otherwise determined to have been negligent.
It should be mentioned that the Palsgraf theory
does not apply, once a duty to a particular person has
arisen, to restrict the liability to that person to the
degree of harm that was foreseeable. Thus, though a
trifling scratch which a defendant negligently causes
X could foreseeably entail only minor injury, but X,
unknown to the plaintiff, has hemophilia and dies, the
defendant would still be liable for the full consequence
of his negligence. The defendant must still take the
plaintiff as he finds him. Justice Cardozo says:
"We may assume .that negligence in relation to the plaintiff
would entail liability for any and all consequences, how-
ever novel or Oxtraordinary." (This on the theory that
they are proximate when they are the direct consequences of
the act.)
In conclusion it may be said that the Palsgraf
theory as enunciated in the opinion did not intend to
alter any theory of negligence other than that of duty.
And it altered this theory only to the extent of the
duty, not as to how the duty itself arose. It could be
said that the Palsgraf theory gave a logic-al consistency
to the theory of duty in negligence, for it carried on
the idea as to how the duty arose to determine the ex-
tent of the duty. Brett, M.R., in Hegven v. Pender,
Court of Appeal, 1883. 11 Q,.B.D. 503, said:
"Whenever one person is placed by circumstances in such a
position with regard to another then everyone of ordinary
sense who did think would at once recognize that if he
did not use ordinary care and skill in his conduct with
regard to those circumstances he would cause danger of
injury to the person or property of the other, a duty
arises to use ordinary care and skill to avoid such
dangers."
(1) FOOTNOTE - Many writers, it must be warned, contend that the Cardozo
view does change, and radically, the accepted doctrine of proximate
cause.
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